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¥  If a debtor operating a grain storage facility has more
than 10,000 bushels of a specific type of grain, which is
usually the case, the trustee must sell the grain and
distribute the proceeds as determined by the court.19
In a case litigated shortly after enactment of the priority
provision for grain producers, the Kansas bankruptcy court
held that the expedited procedures allowing for determining
claims of grain producers in an elevator bankruptcy also
accord priority status above even secured creditors as to
grain held by the elevator which is owned by the produc-
ers.20  Although the court did not cite any specific statutory
language for the holding, the court cited the Senate report to
S.R. 445:
"The bill would require the court to distribute grain assets
or the proceeds of such assets first to producers who have
merely stored their grain in such a facility upon a contract
of bailment..."21
However, the only priority specifically granted by the
Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1984 is a fifth priority for
unsecured claims of grain producers to the extent of
$2,000.22  Thus, it appears that the Kansas Bankruptcy
Court holding represents an extension of the statute.  In a
later Kansas case,23 the court did not discuss the priority of
grain depositors as against an elevator's secured creditors
under bankruptcy law.  The court relied instead on a state
statute24 which gives grain depositors priority over a ware-
house owner and the owner's creditors in the grain stored in
the elevator.
Deferred payment contracts.  Except for the lim-
ited priority in bankruptcy, unsecured creditors typically do
not fare well in an elevator failure.  Grain producers who
have sold and delivered grain to the elevator prior to elevator
failure under deferred payment or deferred pricing contracts25
are unsecured creditors in the event of elevator failure and
usually do not participate in state indemnity funds26 or
elevator bonding protection.27
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  While the debtor was a director of a
bank which held a mortgage against land held by the debtor,
the debtor asked the president of the bank to release the secu-
rity interest on some of the mortgaged land.  The bank
agreed to release the mortgage as to the land.  After the
debtor defaulted on the mortgage and filed bankruptcy, the
bank petitioned for nondischargeability of the debt as to the
released land because the debtor obtained the release by defal-
cation while serving in a fiduciary position.  The court held
that the debtor requested the release as a debtor and not as a
director and committed no fraud.  Although the debtor, as
director, was serving as a fiduciary, the mortgage release was
made by the bank at the request of the debtor as debtor and
not as a director.  In re  Thurman, 121 B.R. 8 8 8
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  The court held that the debtor's
interest in an ERISA qualified retirement fund was not prop-
erty of the estate under the anti-alienation clause of ERISA,
28 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), even though the debtor could with-
draw from the fund upon termination of employment (the
debtor was still employed at the time of filing for
bankruptcy).  In re Cheaver, 121 B.R. 665 (Bankr.
D. D.C. 1990).
EXEMPTIONS. The debtor was not allowed an exemp-
tion for the debtor's interest in an employee retirement plan
because the funds were not reasonably necessary for the sup-
port of the debtor where the debtor was 44 years old and
retained employment with an annual salary and bonuses of
$74,000.  Matter of Hunt, 121 B.R. 349 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1988), aff'd  121 B.R. 352 (S.D. Iowa
1989) .
The debtor's three television sets, VCR, speakers,
phonograph, guitar and lawn mower were held exempt,
under 31 Okla. Stat. § 1(A)(3), as household furniture.  The
court rejected the argument that household furniture could be
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exempt only if the furniture was a "necessity of life."  In re
Adkins, 121 B.R. 393 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1990) .
The debtors were not allowed an exemption in a mobile
home where the debtors had no equity in the home.  The
trustee had obtained an order subordinating an unperfected
security interest in the home to the interests of the trustee as
judicial lienor.  The court held that the subordination did not
make the home estate property so as to allow the debtors to
claim an exemption under Sections 522(g), (h), (i), (j).  In
re  Pebsworth, 121 B.R. 600 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1990) .
Property owned by the debtor and a nondebtor spouse as
tenants by the entirety was not exempt where the property
was subject to claims of creditors of both spouses.  In re
Boyd, 121 B.R. 622 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989).
The debtors argued that a potential claim against a credi-
tor arising from a suit against the creditor was exempt in its
entirety because the suit had not yet commenced at the time
of bankruptcy filing and was, therefore, valueless and within
the limitation for exempt personal property.  The court held
that the claim need not be valued as of the date of
bankruptcy filing because the value of the claim would not
change over time and limited the exempt amount of any
award to the maximum exemption amount for personal
property, less any other personal property claimed as
exempt.  In re  Wissman, 121 B.R. 739 (Bankr.
N.D. W. Va. 1990).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension and
profit-sharing plans was held not to be estate property under
the Illinois exemption providing that ERISA qualified plans
were presumed to be spendthrift trusts.  In re Block, 1 2 1
B.R. 810 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990).
The debtor claimed a homestead exception in a residence
used in part for an ophthalmology practice.  The debtor's
spouse died after the filing of bankruptcy.  The court held
that the exemption was allowed because the debtor was
married at the time of the petition and the use of part of the
residence as a business did not invalidate the residence as a
homestead.  In re  Webb, 121 B.R. 827 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1990).
The debtor's television, video camera, VCR, telephones,
home computer and software were exempt household goods,
allowing the debtor to avoid nonpurchase money security
interests against the property.  In re  Reid, 121 B . R .
875 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1990).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified retirement
plan was not excluded from the bankruptcy estate as a
spendthrift trust under Ind. Code § 30-4-3-2(c) (allowing
presumption as a spendthrift trust for ERISA qualified
plans) because the debtor had the right to withdraw funds
upon termination of employment.  Matter of Cress,
121 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
The Missouri exemption for ERISA qualified plans was
held pre-empted by ERISA.  In re  Gaines, 121 B . R .
1015 (W.D. Mo. 1990), rev'g 106 B.R. 1 0 0 8
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
TURNOVER.  The debtor owned an interest in a
deferred compensation plan which had been adjudged non-
exempt.  The plan provided for withdrawal upon termination
of employment, retirement or unforeseen emergency.  The
court held that the debtor's bankruptcy qualified as an
unforeseen emergency enabling the trustee to require
turnover of the funds to the estate.  In re  Council, 1 2 2
B.R. 64 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
  CHAPTER 12
CONVERSION.  In a short, summary opinion, the
court affirmed the involuntary conversion of the Chapter 12
case to Chapter 7 where the debtor had abused the
bankruptcy proceeding in order to hinder, delay and defraud
creditors.  In re  Foster, 121 B.R. 961 (N.D. Tex .
1990) .
DISMISSAL.  The debtors had filed a Chapter 11 case
which was terminated after substantial completion of the
plan.  The debtors filed a Chapter 12 case after becoming
delinquent on payments to creditors under the Chapter 11
plan.  The court held that the Chapter 12 filing could not be
dismissed merely because the case was filed before all
creditors were completely paid.  The case was remanded to
the bankruptcy court for findings as to the good faith of the
debtors in filing the Chapter 12 case.  In re  Schuldies,
122 B.R. 100 (D. S.D. 1990).
DISPOSABLE INCOME.  The Chapter 12 trustee
petitioned for a modification of the debtors' plan to increase
the amount of payments to unsecured creditors based on
allegations that the debtors had increased disposable income
which was not paid to the trustee.  The court held that the
debtors did not have more disposable income than antici-
pated in the plan because the debtors had increased operation
costs and would need all income for funding the farm opera-
tion and living expenses as provided in the plan.  In re
Wood, 122 B.R. 107 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
PLAN .  This case involved the issue of what property
and the value of that property was to be included in
determining whether the Chapter 12 debtor's plan met the
liquidation test of Section 1225(a)(4).  The debtor had sold,
post-petition, wheat and canola crops and retained $500 of
the proceeds.  The debtor also had unharvested corn and
soybeans as of the date of the confirmation hearing and was
entitled to payment from CRP acres after the confirmation
hearing.  The court held that the value of bankruptcy estate
property for purposes of the liquidation test is determined
solely by Section 541 and does not include property
obtained post-petition.  However, the court held that the date
for determining the hypothetical liquidation is the date of the
confirmation hearing.  Thus, the debtor's post-petition and
pre-confirmation proceeds from the wheat and canola were
included in the liquidation test.  The post-confirmation
proceeds from the corn and soybeans were not included in
the liquidation test amount.  The court found that insuf-
ficient evidence was presented as to the CRP payments to
determine inclusion in the liquidation test.  In re  F o o s ,
121 B.R. 778 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
  PRE-CONFIRMATION PAYMENTS. The Chapter
12 debtor's confirmation hearing was delayed while a creditor
pursued a deficiency action against the debtor.  The
bankruptcy court ordered the debtor to make pre-confirma-
tion payments to the trustee and the debtor objected, arguing
that Chapter 12 does not authorize such payments.  The
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court held that such payments were implicitly authorized by
Section 1226(a) and that the debtor's own agreement that the
payments would be made to allow the trustee to pay prop-
erty taxes made the payments proper.  Stahn v. Haeckel,
920 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1990).
VALUATION.  The court held that the value of the
debtor's home farm was $504,535 based on a well docu-
mented and explained appraisal.  The court rejected the
debtor's appraiser's valuation because the appraiser's explana-
tion was poorly documented and internally inconsistent.  In
re  Mason, 121 B.R. 941 (Bankr. W.D. N . Y .
1990) .
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
TAX LIENS.  The IRS filed a lien and levied against
property of the debtor held by a creditor.  The court held that
the property was bankruptcy estate property because the lien
and levy did not give the IRS constructive possession of the
property but only gave the IRS a perfected security interest
in the property.  In re  Challenge Air Inter., Inc. ,
91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,037 (S.D. F la .
1991) .
POST-PETITION REFUNDS .  The debtors over-
paid their income taxes during their Chapter 7 case but the
refund was offset by the IRS against the debtors' pre-petition
tax liability.  The court held that the debtors were entitled,
as unsecured creditors, to a pro rata share of the refund when
the entire tax liability is paid.  In re  Kaldis, 122 B . R .
54 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
CONTRACTS
CONTRACT.  The debtor delivered grain to an eleva-
tor which issued a check in payment.  The check was
stopped, however, when the elevator learned that the grain
was subject to a security interest.  The debtor refused a joint
check and the parties agreed to store the grain until the pay-
ment method could be settled.  After filing bankruptcy, the
debtors filed for turnover of the grain held by the elevator
and the elevator argued for setoff of the storage charges.  The
court held that the elevator was not required to issue a ware-
house receipt in order to assert a storage contract and that the
evidence supported the existence of an agreement for the
storage of the grain until payment was settled.  Lee v .
Bartlett & Co., 121 B.R. 872 (D. Kan. 1990).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS .  The defendant was a
buyer and processor of beans who posted the daily price for
the beans in local media.  The plaintiff was a bean grower
who telephoned the defendant for the sale of some beans at
the day's quoted price of $19.  The buyer for the defendant
responded that the sale would be "called in;" however, after
the beans were delivered to the defendant, the plaintiff
learned one or two days later that the beans were not pur-
chased but only placed in storage.  The price had also
dropped to $18.  The beans were eventually sold to the
defendant several months later at $15.  The plaintiff sued for
breach of contract to purchase the beans at $19.  Because no
written contract was made, the defendant asserted the statute
of frauds as a defense.  The plaintiff argued that the excep-
tion for delivery and acceptance of the goods applied to
prove the contract.  The court held that material issues of
fact remained as to whether the commingling of the plain-
tiff's beans with other beans by the defendant constituted
acceptance of the alleged contract because some beans were
delivered by other growers without a sale for storage until
later sale.  Joseph Heiting & Sons v. Jacks Bean
Co., 236 Neb. 765, 463 N.W.2d 817 (1990).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM
ADMINISTRATION.  The FCA has issued proposed
amendments to the FCA regulations to implement changes
made by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 involving
structural and administrative changes of FCA institutions.
56 Fed. Reg. 2715 (Jan. 24, 1991).
LENDING LIMITS.  The FCA has reissued proposed
regulations relating to lending limits, appraisals and loan
participations.  The regulations lower the existing limits to
20 percent of capital for all FCS direct lender institutions
except BC's, provide exceptions to the lending limitation,
provide rules for the attribution of loans to separate but
related borrowers and address "single borrower" determina-
tions.  56 Fed. Reg. 2452 (Jan. 23, 1991).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has adopted as final
the classification of Nevada and Idaho as Class Free states.
56 Fed. Reg. 1082 (Jan. 11, 1991) .  The APHIS
has issued an interim rule adding Kentucky to the list of
validated brucellosis-free states.  56 Fed. Reg. 2 1 2 6
(Jan. 22, 1991).
CHICKENS.  The APHIS has adopted as final
amendments to the regulations concerning salmonella
enteritidis in chickens.  The changes affect definitions, test
procedures and restrictions on interstate movement of
chickens, eggs and other articles.  56 Fed. Reg. 3 7 3 0
(Jan. 30, 1991).
COOPERATIVES.  The CCC has issued proposed
regulations providing that ten days after a cooperative is
suspended from participation in the price support program
on behalf of its members, the CCC may call all outstanding
price support loans made to the cooperative.  56 Fed.
Reg. 2147 (Jan. 22, 1991).
CROP INSURANCE .  The FCIS has adopted as
final amendments to the soybean endorsement to change the
end of insurance period for certain states from December 31
to December 10.  56 Fed. Reg. 3005 (Jan. 2 8 ,
1991) .
The FCIC has issued proposed changes in the peanut
insurance regulations to (1) eliminate the contract price
election agreement option for additional peanuts, (2)
eliminate the reduced production guarantee for unharvested
acreage, and (3) establish the lesser of 30 acres or 20 percent
replanting as a requirement to qualify for replant payment.
56 Fed. Reg. 4736 (Feb. 6, 1991).
FARM LOANS .  The FmHA has adopted as final
amendments to the farm loan eligibility regulations which
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provide that applicants must provide current, complete and
truthful information when applying for assistance. 56 Fed.
Reg. 3971 (Feb. 1, 1991).
The FmHA has announced that forms FmHA 1965-22
and 1965-23 have been eliminated and the information for
those forms will be entered directly on terminals from legal
documents.  56 Fed. Reg. 3395 (Jan. 30, 1991).
FARMER OWNED RESERVE.  The CCC has
issued interim regulations implementing changes in the
farmers owned reserve (FOR) program made by the 1990
Farm Bill, including the manner in which wheat and feed
grain producers may enter the FOR program and terms and
conditions of the FOR program.  56 Fed. Reg. 2 6 6 5
(Jan. 24, 1991).
GUARANTEED LOANS .  The FmHA has issued
proposed rules terminating interest accrual on guaranteed
loans 90 days after approval of a liquidation plan.  FmHA
payment of an estimated loss to a lender will terminate
interest accrual on the guaranteed loan for the purpose of
computing a loss payment.  The new rules become effective
with new Approved Lender Agreements as made.  56 Fed.
Reg. 4567 (Feb. 5, 1991).
MILK.  The CCC has adopted as final regulations the
reduction of 5 cents per hundredweight of the milk price
support for 1991 and 11.25 cents per hundredweight for
1992-1995 plus amounts needed to compensate for refunds
to producers of the previous year's production.  56 Fed.
Reg. 4525 (Feb. 5, 1991).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT .  The
PSA has adopted as final regulations reducing the time from
120 to 60 days for filing claims on surety bonds.  56 Fed.
Reg. 2127 (Jan. 22, 1991).
           PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COM-
MODITIES ACT.  The plaintiff was the president, direc-
tor and majority shareholder of a corporation cited for fla-
grant and repeated violations of PACA.  The corporation
sold its business to another corporation which hired the
plaintiff.  The plaintiff attacked the one year employment
restriction on a person responsibly connected with the
violating corporation as violating due process and the Bill of
Attainder clause of the Constitution.  The plaintiff argued
that an exception should be made for non-PACA work done
by the plaintiff.  The court held that the PACA restriction
on employment of persons responsibly connected with a
PACA violator was constitutional.  Siegel v. Lyng, 4 7
Agric. Dec. 1449 (D. D.C. 1988).
The respondent's failure to make timely payment to 20
sellers for 71 lots of perishable commodities was held to be
flagrant and repeated violation of PACA.  The respondent
argued that its filing for bankruptcy should mitigate its
failure to pay because the sellers would be substantially paid
by the bankruptcy estate.  The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) and Judicial Officer (JO) held that only payments
prior to the PACA hearing can mitigate for untimely pay-
ments.  In re  McQueen Bros. Produce Co., Inc. ,
47 Agric. Dec. 1462 (1988).
In a case of apparent first impression, the respondent
appealed a consent order of the ALJ requiring the respondent
to post a $100,000 bond before the respondent's licence
could be reinstated.  The JO held that a consent order is final
and non-appealable when issued.  The JO noted that the
consent order should not have been issued because the
revocation of the respondent's license had been required after
the case was certified to the JO by the ALJ and the JO had
determined that the license should be revoked.  The JO did
discuss and rule on some of the respondent's defenses to the
nonpayment charges.  The JO ruled that the respondent's
excuses for nonpayment were not a defense.  In re  Moore
Marketing Inter., Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1 4 7 2
(1988) .
On remand of a portion of a case to determine whether
violations of PACA were flagrant or repeated so as to bar
employment of a person responsibly connected with the
violator, the JO ruled that no additional evidence would be
allowed.  The JO alternatively ruled that the newly discov-
ered evidence would not be allowed (1) because a final order
had been issued and (2) the remanding appellate court had
made admission of the new evidence discretionary.  In re
Veg-Mix, Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1486 (1988), o n
rem. from 832 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'g
44 Agric. Dec. 1583 (1985).
In a reparations case for failure to pay for two shipments
of grapes, the complainant alleged that the grapes were sold
on a "purchase after inspection" basis.  The JO ruled that the
documents involved in the sale did not use the terms
"purchase after inspection" and that the inspection allowed
by the complainant was insufficient in that the buyer was
allowed only to inspect a sample of the shipments and not
the total shipments.  The respondent's rejection of the
shipments shortly after arrival was ruled proper.  Jim
Hronis & Sons v. Luna Co. Inc., 47 Agric. Dec.
1497 (1988).
WOOL AND MOHAIR.  The AMS has issued pro-
posed rules which combine the existing standards for wool
and wool top and mohair and mohair top into one set of
regulations but keeping the same standards for each.  5 6
Fed. Reg. 2870 (Jan. 25, 1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ALLOCATION OF TAXES .  The decedent's will
directed that the executrix should pay all estate taxes
"without regard to whether such taxes be payable by my
estate or by any beneficiary."  Under Indiana law, unless the
will otherwise directs, estate taxes are not to be paid from
property eligible for a charitable, marital or other deduction.
The court held that the will overrode the Indiana apportion-
ment statute and provided for equal apportionment of estate
taxes against all property, thus decreasing the property
passing to the surviving spouse eligible for the marital
deduction.  Ransburg v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,052 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
The decedent executed a will and established a trust in 1983
and was under a mental disability from October 22, 1986
until death.  The decedent's will funded three trusts, a general
marital trust, a special marital trust and a residuary trust.
The marital trusts had the surviving spouse as sole benefi-
ciary with the surviving spouse having a general power of
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appointment over the general marital trust.  The surviving
spouse disclaimed the general power of appointment over
the general marital trust.  The IRS ruled that the marital
trusts were QTIP where the income was to be distributed
only to the surviving spouse and at least quarterly.  The
surviving spouse's disclaimer of the general power of
appointment qualified the general marital trust for a reverse
QTIP election such that the decedent would be considered the
transferor for GSTT purposes.  Ltr. Rul. 9104048 ,
Nov. 1, 1990.
GIFTS.  The taxpayer transferred ranch land to a corpo-
ration in exchange for preferred stock and debenture notes.
The taxpayer and IRS agreed to stipulate that the value of
the ranch land was $130 an acre.  At that value, the land was
worth more than the stock and debentures received.  The
taxpayer argued that the value of the land as held by the cor-
poration was less than $130/acre because the land had a low
tax basis and a high "deferred tax" which would lessen the
return to the corporation if the land was sold.  The court
rejected this argument, holding that the fair market value of
the land at the time of the transfer determines the existence
of a gift.  Becker v. U.S., 751 F.Supp. 827 ( D .
Neb. 1990).
The taxpayers were members/shareholders of a recreation
club which was a corporation.  The taxpayers made contri-
butions to the corporation for use in building a new club-
house.  The IRS ruled that the contributions were gifts to
the other shareholders and were eligible for the gift tax
exclusion because the taxpayers and other shareholders
received a current benefit from the clubhouse.  Ltr. R u l .
9104024, Oct. 29, 1990.
INSURANCE PROCEEDS .  The decedent estab-
lished a trust with an independent trustee which obtained a
life insurance policy on the decedent.  The decedent held no
incidents of ownership of the policy but paid all the premi-
ums.  The court held that the proceeds of the policy were
not included in the decedent's gross estate.  Est. o f
Richins v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-23.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
established a marital trust for the surviving spouse.  The
decedent's will indicated that the marital trust was intended
to be eligible for the marital deduction but the will allowed
the trustee the discretion as to making a QTIP election and
provided that if the trustee chooses not to make a QTIP elec-
tion for some of the marital trust, the non-QTIP property is
to be administered by a separate family trust which did not
distribute income to the surviving spouse.  The IRS ruled
that the surviving spouse's interest in the marital trust was
not eligible for QTIP because the trustee had the discretion
to administer the property under the family trust.  Ltr.
Rul. 9104003, Sept. 14, 1990.
Decedent's will bequeathed to the surviving spouse a
pecuniary amount equal to the maximum marital deduction.
Decedent also left a living trust which directed the trustee to
pay the taxes of the trust estate and pay the surviving
spouse the pecuniary amount equal to the maximum marital
deduction.  However, the decedent's estate did not have suffi-
cient property to pay the taxes and pay the surviving spouse
the full pecuniary amount, and no other bequests were avail-
able from which to take the tax payments.  The court held
that federal estate and income taxes and state inheritance
taxes were to be charged against the estate before determina-
tion of the maximum marital deduction amount (one-half of
the adjusted gross estate in this case).  Martin v. U . S . ,
91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,055 (7th Cir .
1991), rev'g  90-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 6 0 , 0 1 5
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (earlier case summarized in Vol 1,
ALD p. 98).
Most of the decedent's estate passed to two trusts with a
marital trust to be funded with an amount equal to the max-
imum marital deduction allowable less any amount neces-
sary to use the maximum amount of credits allowable to the
estate.  The court held that the estate was entitled to an
unlimited marital deduction for amounts passing to the
marital trust because the bequest was not a maximum
marital deduction bequest subject to the ERTA transitional
rule limiting the marital deduction to one-half of the
adjusted gross estate. Est. of Lucas v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1991-22.
PRIOR TRANSFER CREDIT.  A husband and
wife died simultaneously in an accident with the husband
deemed to have survived the wife under Louisiana law.  For
purposes of the prior transfer credit, I.R.C. § 2013, the
value of an usufruct left by the wife to the husband was to
be valued using the mortality tables in Treas. Reg. §
20.2031-7.  The court agreed with the IRS contention that
the usufruct should not have a value because of the wife's
immediate death, holding that the medical condition of the
surviving spouse can be used to determine the valuation of
the prior transfer.  Est. of Carter v. U.S., 921 F.2d
63 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'g  90-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,003 (E.D. La. 1989) (earlier case
summarized in Vol 1, ALD p. 58).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The decedent's
interest in ranch property passed to three grandchildren in
trust.  The estate made a special use valuation election con-
taining all required information but the recapture agreement
was signed only by the trustee.  Within 90 days after the
IRS notified the estate of the incomplete election, the estate
filed an amended return with the trust beneficiaries' signa-
tures on the recapture agreement.  The court held that the
first election substantially complied with the election
requirements entitling the estate to make an amended elec-
tion within 90 days after notification by IRS.  The decision
was reviewed by the Tax Court with six judges dissenting.
Est. of McAlpine v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. No. 6
(1991) .
    TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
Married taxpayers transferred their community property
interests in a second home to each other as equal undivided
interests in the home and contributed each interest to two
five year trusts with one taxpayer as the beneficiary of one
trust and the spouse as beneficiary of the other trust.  The
remainder interest of the first trust is held by the spouse but
the remainder of the second trust passes to the taxpayers'
children.  The IRS ruled that because the home was personal
property, Section 2036(c) does not apply to the trusts.  In
addition, because the trusts are not fully reciprocal, the first
trust is not includible in the gross estate of the spouse.
Ltr. Rul. 9104011, Oct. 26, 1990.
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
ACCOUNTING METHOD.  The taxpayer corporation
reported taxable income on the cash method but kept its
books on the accrual method with accompanying accoun-
tant's working papers to determine taxable income.  The
IRS ruled that although no statutory or regulatory authority
exists for deviation from strict book-tax conformity, the
taxpayer's methods were acceptable under case law, legisla-
tive history and IRS rulings.  Ltr. Rul. 9103001, June
19, 1990.
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS.  The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder in several corporations.  The court held that
expenditures made by the corporations which were not for
reasonable business purposes of the corporations were con-
structive dividends to the shareholder and that the IRS did
not need to prove that the shareholder derived personal bene-
fit from the expenditures.  However, the court also held that
the IRS had demonstrated that the shareholder received the
personal benefit of the use of a car purchased by the corpora-
tions and release from a mortgage paid by the corporations,
thus demonstrating willful intent to evade taxes.  U.S. v .
Mews, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,044 (7th
Cir. 1991).
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS .  The IRS has
reissued temporary regulations concerning the definition of
"highly compensated employee" to include provisions for
applying the definition under the qualified separate line of
business rules of I.R.C. § 414(r).  56 Fed. Reg. 3 9 7 6
(Feb. 1, 1991).
ESTIMATED TAX .  In 1986, the taxpayer and
spouse elected on their joint return to have their overpay-
ment of taxes credited to their 1987 taxes.  In 1987, the tax-
payer filed a separate return and argued that 50 percent of the
1986 overpayment should be allocated to the taxpayer.  The
court held that absent an agreement between the spouses as
to allocation of the overpayment, Treas. Reg. §
301.6015(b)-1(b) applied to allocate the overpayment
between the spouses based on the pro rata share of income
in 1986.  Overpayment of taxes in 1987 would be similarly
allocated.  Gordon v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,036 (D. Md. 1991).
INSTALLMENT REPORTING.  A partnership
purchased a building from a bank, giving cash and a note.
The bank elected to report the gain from the sale on the
installment method.  The bank refinanced the loan through
the purchase of industrial development bonds which were
paid using the rent paid by the partnership for the use of the
building after the property was transferred to the city which
issued the bonds.  The court held that the bond refinancing
of the transaction turned the installment sale of the building
into a commercial financing of the purchase by the bank;
thus, the bank was required to report all gain upon the
refinancing by the bonds.  First Nat'l Bank i n
Albuquerque v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶
50,005 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g T.C. Memo.
1989-264 .
PARTNERSHIPS
ALLOCATION OF LOSSES.  The taxpayer contributed
$500,000 to a partnership which amended its partnership
agreement to allocate 75 percent of the partnership losses to
the taxpayer for two years.  The agreement also provided for
the return of the entire contributed capital from income or
proceeds of sales of partnership property or upon partnership
liquidation.  The court applied a capital accounts analysis to
determine that the allocation of the losses lacked economic
substance in that the losses did not decrease the taxpayer's
capital account.  The court rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the transaction had a business purpose in that the tax-
payer's contribution was necessary to keep the partnership
business going.  Young v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,045 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'g
T.C. Memo. 1987-397.
S CORPORATIONS
RE-ELECTION.  The corporation had elected S corpora-
tion status as of October 1, 1987 but filed a revocation of
the election on November 25, 1987, effective October 1,
1987.  The IRS ruled that the corporation could make a new
election effective October 1, 1989.  Ltr. Rul. 9104030 ,
Oct. 30, 1990.
S TRUSTS.  A testamentary trust for one beneficiary
was ruled a qualified Subchapter S trust where all trust
income is to be distributed currently, trust corpus may only
be distributed to the beneficiary and the beneficiary's income
interest terminates upon the death of the beneficiary.  Ltr.
Rul. 9103015, Oct. 19, 1990.
The grantor established two trusts, each owning S corpo-
ration stock and having one beneficiary to which all income
is to be distributed at least annually.  The trustees have
discretion to distribute corpus to the beneficiaries and all
trust corpus is to be distributed when the beneficiaries reach
age 35 if they have met certain education and income
requirements, if the beneficiary ceases to be a citizen or resi-
dent of the U.S. or upon termination of the trust.  The bene-
ficiaries have only a testamentary power of appointment
over trust corpus.  The IRS ruled that the trusts were quali-
fied Subchapter S trusts.  Ltr. Rul. 9104008, Oct.
23, 1990.
TRUSTS .  The grantor established trust for children
and funded the trusts with loans made by the grantor to the
trusts.  The court held that the grantor was the owner of the
trusts and liable for the taxes on trust income because the
grantor had authority to demand repayment of the loans at
any time.  Kushner v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-
26 .
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
ADVERSE POSSESSION .  The plaintiffs were
owners of a collector-drain ditch which passed through the
defendant's land and petitioned for an injunction against the
defendants' use of water from the ditch.  The defendants
argued that an oral agreement between the parties' ancestors
entitled them to use water from the ditch for irrigation and
that they had obtained rights to the water through adverse
possession.  The court held that adverse possession was not
sufficiently alleged by the defendants because they had not
alleged sufficient facts of use of the water "exclusive of the
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use and needs of the rightful owner," which the court defined
as use which deprived the owner of needed water.  Because
the defendants alleged that their use of the water did not
harm the plaintiffs, the defendants' use of the water was not
adverse to the plaintiff's rights to the water.  Boise-Kuna
Irrigation District v. Gross, 801 P.2d 1 2 9 1
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
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SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY.  The plaintiff bank repossessed seed corn
grown by a debtor after the debtor had defaulted on a note
secured by the seed corn.  Another creditor of the debtor sued
the bank on the basis of a contract with one of the partners
of the debtor for purchase of the seed corn and the bank
settled with that creditor for $30,000 paid to the creditor out
of the proceeds of the seed corn.  The bank then brought the
present action against the debtor for indemnity of that pay-
ment arguing that the bank's security interest had been made
subordinate to the seed corn contract because the partner had
personally made the contract to sell the corn, thus subordi-
nating the security interest granted by the debtor partnership.
The court found that the bank's security interest was valid
because the financing statement described the seed corn as
that growing on the individual partner's land and the individ-
ual partner was an obligee of the note; however, the security
interest had lapsed by passage of time and had not been
properly continued.  However, the court held that because
the creditor had not received possession of the seed corn
under the contract, the creditor's interest in the seed corn did
not defeat the bank's unperfected security interest in the seed
corn.  Therefore, the bank's settlement with the creditor was
not required by law and the debtor was not liable to indem-
nify the bank for payment of the settlement.  Nat'l Bank
of Fulton County v. Haupricht Bros., 55 Ohio
App.3d 249, 564 N.E.2d 101 (1988).
WAIVER.  The plaintiff bank sued the defendant mar-
keting agency for conversion of dairy cows owned by a
debtor of the bank who had granted the bank a security inter-
est in the cows.  The defendant argued that the bank had
waived its security interest in allowing the debtor to sell
collateral cows over several years without prior permission.
The court held that the bank had waived its security interest
through course of conduct over more than eight years in
allowing the debtor to sell collateral cows without prior
permission or even objection after the sales.  Gretna
State Bank v. Cornbelt Livestock Co., 236 Neb.
715, 463 N.W.2d 795 (1990).
CITATION UPDATE
Arenjay Corp. v. Comm'r, 920 F.2d 269 (5th
Cir. 1991) (administrative adjustments of smal l
S corporations) see p. 35 supra.
Cadwallader v. Comm'r, 919 F.2d 1273 (7th
Cir. 1990) (home office deduction), see p. 14 supra.
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